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ARGUMENT 
I. NEITHER BECK NOR BILLINGS RESTRICTS THE 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OTHERWISE AVAILABLE FOR 
BREACH OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT. 
The parties' differing views in this case appear to stem from certain assumptions 
by UNUM that Machan submits are incorrect. 
The first of UNUM's assumptions is that, prior to Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), consequential damages were unavailable for breach of 
an insurance contract. {See UNUM Br., pp. 9-10) ("Until Beck, an insured's damages 
were limited to the policy coverage and the insured had no effective remedy against an 
insurer that refused to bargain or settle in good faith in a first-part situation.") As noted 
in Machan's initial brief, however, this Court has recognized the availability of such 
damages for breach of an insurance contract since at least Pacific Coast Title Co. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 322, 325 P.2d 906 (1958). Any 
subsequent dictum that suggests otherwise is, simply, incorrect in the face of this Court's 
own precedent. 
Another of UNUM's assumptions is that "Utah law treats insurance contracts 
differently than other contracts." That statement normally would be true, except that 
UNUM intends it to mean that the law treats insureds less favorably than parties to other 
contracts (specifically, UNUM says, by disallowing any consequential damages for 
breach of contract). UNUM's suggestion is inconsistent with the longstanding 
recognition that insurance contracts have "peculiar characteristics," Collier v. Heinz, 827 
P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1992), including the fact that they are a "classic example of an 
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adhesion contract." United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 522 
(Utah 1993). "Insurance contracts are typically drafted by insurance company attorneys 
who are duty-bound to protect the interests of their clients. The terms of a typical 
insurance policy are not negotiated by the insurer and the insured. A policy is usually 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Id. Moreover, "an insured who has suffered a loss 
and is pressed financially is at a marked disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer 
over payment of that loss," and can suffer "catastrophic consequences" from non-
payment. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798. 
It was a similar imbalance of power that led this Court to recognize attorney fees 
as a consequential damage for breach of an employment contract. Heslop v. Bank of 
Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992). The Heslop court's discussion of that issue is 
instructive here: 
In Canyon Country Store v. Bracey [,781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989)], this court 
interpreted consequential damages to allow attorney fees in a first-party insurance 
claim. The rationale for allowing attorney fees as recoverable damages within the 
contemplation of the parties in first-party insurance claims is also applicable to 
employment claims. Terminated employees, like injured insurance claimants, find 
themselves in a particularly vulnerable position once the employer breaches the 
employment agreement. Employers can reasonably foresee that wrongfully 
terminated employees will be forced to file suit to enforce their employment 
contracts and will foreseeably incur attorney fees. 
Id. 
UNUM articulates no social goals or other policy considerations that would lead 
this Court to treat someone who suffers the breach of a disability insurance contract worse 
than, say, someone who suffers the breach of a contract to buy a refrigerator. Although 
UNUM says that allowing attorney fees for breach of contract "places an unfair hammer" 
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over insurers' heads, that is hardly a realistic depiction. When one weighs the impact of a 
possible attorney fee award against a multi-million dollar corporation versus the impact of 
an individual receiving no income, the insurer's attorney fee exposure compared to the 
insured's devastation is at most a ball pein hammer against a 20-pound sledge. 
A third misassumption by UNUM is that, unless Beck and/or Billings v. Union 
Bankers Ins, Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996), are read to eliminate consequential damages 
for breach of an insurance contract, the damages for that cause of action will be the same 
as for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a concept that this Court 
rejected in Billings. To show the error of this premise, additional analysis of the 
distinction between contract/bad faith damages may be helpful. 
Machan pointed out in his initial brief that damages for breach of an insurance 
contract are limited to ordinary consequential damages, those fairly within the 
contemplation of the parties. Damages for bad faith, however, are "more closely aligned 
with a tort damages approach." Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. That result is consistent with 
the fact that an insurer who is guilty of bad faith has acted unreasonably, which is itself a 
tort-like concept. Thus, the broader damages available for bad faith are not limited to 
those within the contemplation of the parties. 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate this distinction in action is to take an example 
from this case. As UNUM notes, one element of damage sought by Machan in his bad 
faith case was the harm to his mentally ill son caused by Machan's inability to continue 
paying for the son's psychological treatment. Unlike Machan's own worsened medical 
condition, which would be within the contemplation of the parties to a disability 
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insurance contract, Machan acknowledges that his son 's mental illness might not. 
UNUM probably would not be expected to know of that consequence of its breach of 
contract. 
If UNUM acts in bad faith, however, those damages are recoverable, assuming 
they were proximately caused by the insurer's unreasonableness. Machan becomes, in a 
sense, an "eggshell skull" victim - the culpable party takes the victim as it finds him. 
E.g., Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 428 (Utah 1995) (recognizing 
common law tort principle "commonly referred to as the 'thin skull' or 'eggshell skull' 
doctrine: One who injures another takes the injured as she finds him"); Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 43, at 292 (5th ed. 1984). 
A third erroneous assumption in UNUM's brief is that Billings dictates that no 
consequential damages are available for ordinary breach of an insurance contract. To get 
to that point, UNUM quotes a section of Billings in which this Court wrote, "We 
recognized [in Beck] that in appropriate circumstances, 'consequential damages for 
breach of contract may reach beyond the contract terms.'" (See UNUM Br., p. 14). 
UNUM then states that, "obviously, the 'appropriate circumstance' to which Billings 
referred is a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'" {Id.) 
Machan does not find it so obvious. A more logical reading of that language is 
that the "appropriate circumstance" when an insured may recover consequential damages 
beyond the contract terms is when he can prove that they were within the contemplation 
of the parties, that they were proximately caused by the breach, and that they can be 
determined with reasonable certainty. See, e.g., Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
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P.2d 114 418-19 (( Ital i 1989) (lost pi of i t s ; i vva/t di ibk " as < :onsequential damages for 
breac oi contract only if reasonably foreseeable, caused by insurer's failure to pay, and 
not speculative). 
UNUM also characterizes Billings as stating "thai (In: consequential damages the 
plar *ff was seeking for breach of the implied good faith covenant were not recoverable 
absent a breach of the implied covenant." (UNUM B: " rx T i actuality, however, the 
Court said that the "broad," tort-like damages availab • -. - • * i -.=! > . not i ecov erable 
for mc iv breach ol' contmi I ,S< v () 1 S P ?il ,it 466-467. If this Court meant to state that no 
consequential damages at all were available for breach of contract, it would have been 
easy enough to say so. Moreover, if the Court intended to immunize insurance companies 
from the damages lh.il a11\ milin eonlracl \\\ Iciulaiil tsonld hnu1 lo pin one would have 
expected at least a comment, if not an explanation, regarding that abrupt departure.1 
1
 UNUM acknowledges that, after Billings, the Court of Appeals held that consequential 
damages were recoverable in a breach of contract case. Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 
939 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (1997). The only 
distinction UNUM offers is to suggest that, even though Castillo expressly addressed 
breach of contract and bad faith was not pled, the case still somehow must have involved 
the breach of the covenant of good faith The opinion contains no support for I JNUM's 
speculation in this regard. 
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II. UNUM'S REQUEST FOR THIS COURT TO OVERRULE BILLINGS 
AS TO ATTORNEY FEES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT IS 
IMPROPER. 
A. UNUM's argument that Billings should be overruled is not within the 
certified questions. 
The whole point of requiring an Order of Certification is to enable the parties and 
the Court to know precisely the issues on which the federal court requests clarification. 
In this case, the parties stipulated to the wording of the certified questions, which were 
incorporated into a stipulated Order of Certification. (See Exhibit 1 to Machan's opening 
brief.) 
Certified Question No. 1 explicitly recognized that attorney fees are available for 
breach of an insurance contract: "In a first party insurance situation, may an insured 
recover consequential damages, other than attorney's fees, for breach of the express terms 
of an insurance contract? . . . " (Emphasis added). In its brief, however, UNUM declares 
that it "extends the first issue and also argues that [Billings] should be overruled in part, 
and that attorney's fees should not be recoverable in a first party insurance situation 
unless the insured proves that the insurance company acted in bad faith." (UNUM Br., 
pp. 6-7). 
Machan strenuously objects to the injection of this new issue. Not only is it 
completely out of the blue, but it also happens to conflict directly with the certified 
question, which assumes the availability of such fees. In reliance on the prior stipulation 
and the Order, Machan did not address this issue in his opening brief, nor was it ever 
raised in the federal district court. If the Court considers the issue, UNUM will have 
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received two opportunities lo address it, whereas Machan will have only one, even though 
the presumed purpose behind simultaneous filings was to avoid a briefing advantage to 
either side. 
B. UNUM has not adduced sufficient grounds to disregard stare decisis and 
overrule Billings. 
Under the principle of stare decisis, a court of last resort "will follow the rule of 
law which it has established in earlier cases, unless t;k\t!'l\ un u»ieed lh.il *he mle was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
398-99 (Utah 1994). 
Billing s i/" I Won Banker ;s is an eight-year old case. It was based upon this Court's 
earlier decision in Canyon Country, supra. UNUM claims, however, citing a dissent in 
Billings, that it was "unclear whether the attorney fees in Canyon Country were awarded 
IV ii bieaeh of(he implied u»uii«iiif or loi hn\u h \A Ihe express term.-, oftlir in\tii;iiiee 
contract." (UNUM Br., p. 18 n. 7). That assertion is not supported by Canyon Country 
itself, which seems pretty clear: 
Canyon Country's claim for recovery of fees was predicated on the theory that 
attorney fees were an item of consequential damages flowing from the insurers' 
breach of contract. This is a legitimate theory of damages, as the trial court 
recognized. 
Id. at 420. In Moore v. Energy Mutual Insurance Co,, 814 1"' ,'" 11 I 14 1 I I 1 } (I I (a 11 \ pp. 
1991), the Co* « y ikewise had no difficulty in concluding that, under Canyon 
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Country, "attorney fees may be awarded as consequential damages against an insurer for 
breach of contract."2 
The Billings rule, therefore, was not originally erroneous. Nor is it "no longer 
sound" due to changing conditions. The policy considerations militating in favor of 
allowing attorney fees to injured insureds (imbalance of power, potentially devastating 
consequences, etc.) remain fully viable. Finally, it cannot be said that "more good than 
harm" would come by eliminating a remedy presently available to a vulnerable group of 
plaintiffs. 
UNUM further argues that, "Not surprisingly, Billings appears not to have been 
followed." (UNUM Br., p. 20). The only two cases cited by UNUM for that rather 
presumptuous proposition are Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 
1997), and Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, 2000 UT App 121,1 P.3d 570. 
Gibbs contains no discussion of attorney fees for breach of contract. The only claim 
addressed by the court (and therefore, presumably, by the parties) was bad faith. Thus, 
the Court merely recognizes that attorney fees are available for breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; it does not then indicate they are unavailable for ordinary 
2
 UNUM claims that the Moore court erred in also citing Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. 
National Amer. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 1988). According to UNUM, the 
Zions court held that attorney fees would have been recoverable in a bad faith claim, "but 
that attorney fees were specifically not recoverable for straight breach of contract in that 
case because there was no attorney's fees provision in the insurance contract." (UNUM 
Br., p. 19, n. 7). In actuality, Zions denied attorney fees because they were excluded 
under the title insurance contract. Acknowledging an earlier Utah Supreme Court 
construing an identical exclusion as precluding fees, this Court stated that, while it "might 
question the result" in the earlier case, it declined to depart from it. 749 P.2d at 657. 
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breach of contract, an issue that apparently was not before it. Pugh is the same: A 
recognition by the court that attorney fees are available for breach of the covenant of 
good faith, with no discussion of ordinary breach of contract. It is unreasonable to 
suggest that either of these courts considered Billings and rejected it. See also, Johnson v. 
Life Investors Insurance Co. of America, 216 F.3d 1087, 2000 WL 954840 (10th Cir. 
2000; unpublished) (citing Billings for the proposition that attorney fees are recoverable 
for breach of insurance contract). 
Finally, UNUM's mention of the Model Uniform Jury Instructions (MUJI) as 
"agreeing" with it does not affect the resolution. MUJI was issued in 1993 (before 
Billings was issued), and reflects valued, but not binding, compromises reached by 
various committees of lawyers. At most, MUJI instructions constitute a starting point for 
the preparation of jury instructions. 
III. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-26-301(l) SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED. 
UNUM's brief notes, and Machan acknowledges, that no decision has yet 
recognized a private cause of action under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301. (Nor has any 
decision rejected such a cause of action.) UNUM also correctly observes that appellate 
courts often refuse to create a private right of action based upon violation of a statute. 
While it might be the exception rather than the rule, the fact remains that there is no 
absolute prohibition to recognizing such a right. 
UNUM points out, though, that Section 31A-26-301 is part of a regulatory scheme 
under which the Insurance Commission is charged with enforcement penalties and 
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procedures. That much is true. It has never been the case, however, that the existence of 
a regulatory scheme automatically precludes a common law cause of action. The fact that 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission regulates unsafe products does not preclude a 
product liability claim any more than the Utah State Bar's ability to penalize lawyers 
precludes a legal malpractice claim. The two can be, and often are, co-extensive. 
UNUM also suggests that Spackman v. Board of Education of Box Elder County 
School Dist., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533, 538, is inapposite because that case involved 
various clauses of the State Constitution rather than a statute. The fact remains, however, 
that in upholding a private right of action to enforce those constitutional provisions, this 
Court relied on Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which expressly 
addresses private causes of action arising under statutes. (Indeed, in citing Section 874A, 
this Court noted that the section uses the term "legislative provisions," but added that it 
also applies to constitutional provisions. See 16 P.3d at 538.) 
The need for a private right of faction for violation of Section 31A-26-301 is 
especially great considering the significant restrictions on first-party bad faith cases that 
insurers have successfully argued under Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 
68, 56 P.3d 524. As noted in Machan's opening brief, Judge Cassell (and, in the 
undersigned's experience, certain state court judges as well) read Prince as eliminating all 
claims for bad faith as long as an insurer purports to utilize at least one "expert," 
regardless of that expert's ties to the insurer or other factors that evidence bad faith. 
3
 The undersigned have argued, unsuccessfully, that this Court intended Prince to be read 
with all of an insurer's duties of good faith in mind, including, "at the very least, that the 
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Finally, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the 2002 clarifications to 
the statute are probative of the legislature's intent or recognition that violations of Section 
31A-26-301 are actionable. The statute expressly applies to first-party insurance claims. 
("This section applied only to claims made by claimants in direct privity of contract with 
the insurer.") (emphasis added). That language clearly suggests legislative intent to 
permit a common law right of action for first party claimants, but to preclude such a 
common law claim in the third-party situation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, plaintiff Gary Machan 
respectfully requests that the Court answer the certified questions as follows: 
1. To clarify that plaintiffs in breach of insurance contract actions are entitled to 
seek the same types of consequential damages available to plaintiffs in other breach of 
contract claims; and 
2. To clarify that a private right of action for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-21-301 exists for plaintiffs who are within the class of persons protected by the statute. 
insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is 
valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling the claim." Prince, 2002 UT 68, ^  27. An insurer should only be 
able to assert that a claim was fairly debatable if it has complied with those duties, not 
merely by the act of hiring any expert of its choosing. In light of the extremely broad 
reading that courts are giving Prince, however, if no private right of action is available 
under the statute, plaintiffs are effectively left without a remedy for breach of these duties 
of fair investigation, evaluation, and payment. 
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